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Leuven; Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2004: 289-309. Permalink. © 2004 Peeters Publishers. Used with
permission.
ORIENTALIA LOV ANIENSIA 
ANALECTA 
---139---
'WORDS, TEXTS AND CONCEPTS 
CRUISING THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
Studies on the sources, contents and influences of 
Islamic civilization and Arabic philosophy and science 
Dedicated to Gerhard Endress 
on his sixty-fifth birthday 
edited by 
R. ARNZEN and J. THIELMANN 
UITGEVERIJ PEETERS en DEPARTEMENT OOSTERSE STUDIES 
LEUVEN - PARIS - DUDLEY, MA 
2004 
SEPARATE MATERIAL INTELLECT IN 
A VERROES' MATURE PHILOSOPHY 
Richard C. T AYLOR 
Marquette University, Milwaukee 
The doctrine of the material intellect promulgated by Averroes (i126-
1198) in his latest works is surely the teaching for which he has been 
most maligned both in the medieval era and in modern times. In medi-
eval times Duns Scotus spoke of "That accursed Averroes" whose "fan-
tastic conception, intelligible neither to himself nor to others, assumes 
the intellective part of man to be a sort of separate substance united to 
man through the medium of sense images." I In modern times, as even-
handed a scholar as Herbert Davidson has felt compelled to conclude 
that Averroes, who regarded himself as following as closely as possible 
in the very steps of Aristotle, "transforms the material intellect into some-
thing wholly un-Aristotelian" as "a hybrid entity that his master [Aristo-
tle] would have found extremely odd."2 Nevertheless, it is precisely his 
teaching on the nature of the material intellect which provided principles 
needed for the orderly completion of his mature philosophical thought 
on the nature of First Philosophy as metaphysics, on God and the hierar-
chy of intellects moving the heavens, and on the role of religion in the 
lives of individuals and in the political state. What is more, the examina-
tion of that doctrine and its ramifications in these areas sheds consider-
able light on his philosophical methodology and the end which he saw 
philosophy ultimately serving. This article expounds the importance of 
the doctrine of the material intellect in A verroes' mature teachings with 
1 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS, Quaestiones in Lib. IV Sententiarum (Ordinatio) Dist. 43, q. 2, 
in: Joannis Duns Scoti, Doctoris Subtilis, Ordinis Minorum, Opera Omnia, Quae 
hucusque reperiri potuerunt. Collecta, recognita, notis, scholiis, & commentariis illustra-
ta, a PP. Hibemis, Collegii Romani S. Isidori Professoribus [ ... J, 12 vols, Lugduni: Sump-
tibus Laurentii Durand, 1639, vol. X, p. 22; translated by Allan WOLTER, Duns Scotus. 
Philosophical Writings, Edinburgh - London, 1962, p. 146-147, and quoted by Irving 
M. COP! and Carl COHEN, Introduction to Logic, 8th ed., New York - London, 1990, p. 
127. I also cite this in Richard C. TAYLOR, Averroes on Psychology and the Principles of 
Metaphysics, in: The Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (1998), p. 507-523. 
2 Herbert A. DAVIDSON, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes on Intellect. Their cosmo-
logies, theories of the active intellect, and theories of human intellect, Oxford, 1992, 
p. 356 and 354 respectively. 
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a view to showing, pace Duns Scotus and Davidson, how very intelligi-
ble and how very Aristotelian that doctrine is when considered in con-
text. 
Ibn Bajja had initiated an Andalusian tradition of philosophical com-
mentaries on the works of Aristotle following in the model of al-Farab! 
to a considerable degree. In t~e case of A verroes, his own commentaries 
were in three forms, epitomizing Short Commentaries, paraphrasing 
Middle Commentaries, and extensive Long Commentaries, this latter 
containing the complete text of Aristotle together with detailed section 
by section commentary drawing on all available sources from the Greek 
and Arabic traditions. The issue of the material intellect is found in all 
three sorts of A verroes' commentaries on the De Anima of Aristotle and 
is also taken up in considerable detail in at least five other works extant 
today in Arabic, Hebrew or Latin3. 
The problem A verroes faced from the start was that of providing a 
coherent account of human intellectual understanding sufficient to sat-
isfy the needs of Aristotle's many teachings in his De Anima. There Ar-
istotle had raised the issue of whether the intellect might be a different 
sort of soul or power than sensation. Working from the presumption of 
Posterior Analytics II 19 that the human soul is constituted to come to 
have knowledge of things of the world, Aristotle went on to give a 
sketch of what this must entail psychologically and epistemologically in 
De Anima 3.4. This power of the soul must be first and foremost recep-
3 These works include (1) the Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction (cf. Kalman P. 
BLAND, The Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction with the Active Intellect by Ibn 
Rushd with the Commentary of Moses Narboni. A critical edition and annotated transla-
tion [Moreshet, Studies in Jewish History, Literature and Thought, 7], New York, 1982); 
- (2) Epistle #1 On Conjunction and (3) Epistle #2 On Conjunction (cf. Marc GEOFFROY 
et Carlos STEEL reds and trs], Averroes. La beatitude de l'ame. Editions, traductions 
annotees et etudes doctrinales et historiques [ ... ] par M. Geoffroy et C. Steel [Sic et non], 
Paris, 2001. This work contains two short treatises by Averroes "On Conjunction with the 
Agent Intellect" translated into French with notes by Marc Geoffroy. These translations 
are based on Geoffroy's readings of the manuscripts used by I. HERCZ led. and tr.], Drei 
Abhandlungen uber die Conjunction des separaten Intellects mit dem Menschen, von 
Averroes [Vater und Sohn], aus dem Arabischen iibersetzt von Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Ber-
lin, 1869); - (4) De separatione primi principii (cf. Carlos STEEL and Guy GULDENTOPS, 
An Unknown Treatise of Averroes Against the Avicennians on the First Cause. Edition 
and Translation, in: Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Medievales [formerly 
Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale] 64 [1997], p. 86-135); and - (5) the 
Commentary on the De Intellectu of Alexander (cf. Mauro ZONTA, La tradizione guideo-
araba ed ebraica del De intellectu di Alessandro di Afrodisia e il testo originale del 
Commento di Averroe, in: Annali di Ca' Foscari. Rivista della Facoltii di Lingue e 
Letterature Straniere dell'Universitii di Venezia 40.3 [2001] [Serie orientale, 32], p. 17-
35, Arabic text of Averroes' Commentary on the De Intellectu of Alexander, p. 27-34. 
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tive of the forms of things with a noetic identity free of interfering dis-
tortion caused by mixture with the body or by mixture with any pre-ex-
isting nature in this power itself. Before it thinks it is nothing but this 
receptivity enabling it to think and judge, that is, to classify particulars 
in terms of universals. In this way the human receptive disposition for 
knowledge, later called material intellect by Alexander of Aphrodisias4, 
accounts for the development of human intellectual understanding in an 
individual knower in terms of a reception of forms based on sense and 
subsequent to perception. This is a grasp of essence in a way which 
prescinds from the particularity of the thing so as to enable the predica-
tion of universals indicative of knowledge. Yet just how can this power 
of understanding belong to individual human beings and not itself be a 
body or a power in a body? 
A VERROES' EARLY TEACHINGS ON THE MATERIAL INTELLECT 
A verroes' first effort in grappling with the issue of the material intellect 
was in his Short Commentary (or Epitome, Mukhta~ar) on the De Anima 
(ca. 1158-60)5. There he holds that forms from the world are received as 
A Hebrew translation of this work was edited by Herbert DAVIDSON, Averroes' Commen-
tary on the De Intel/ectu Attributed to Alexander [in Hebrew] in: Sefer ha-yovelli-Shelo-
moh Pines, bi-melot /0 shemonim shanah [Shlomo Pines Jubilee Volume], 2 vols [Mehke-
re Yerushalayim be-mahashevet Yi'sra'el, 7,9], Jerusalem 1988-1990, vol. I, p. 205-217). 
4 The term uAm'>c; voGC; "material intellect", is coined by Alexander of Aphrodisias 
in his Paraphrase of the De Anima. See ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, Praeter commen-
taria Scripta minora. De Anima cum mantissa, ed. Ivo BRUNS (Commentaria in Aristo-
telem Graeca, Supplementum Aristotelicum, II, 1), Berlin, 1887, p. 81.24; and Athanasios 
P. FOTINIs, The De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias. A translation and commentary, 
Washington, D.C., 1980, p. 105. The Arabic text is not extant. A new English translation 
is in preparation by Victor Caston. 
5 References are to the 1985 Arabic edition: Epitome de anima, edidit Salvator 
G6MEZ NOGALES, (Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem, vol. A, 31), Madrid: 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas Instituto "Miguel Asin", Instituto Hispa-
no-Arabe de Cultura, 1985. (Another edition has been prepared by Ahmed Fouad EL-
AHWANI, Talkhl~ Kitab al-Nafs /i-Abf l-Walfd ibn Rushd wa-arba' rasa'i/, Cairo, 1950). 
Gomez Nogales has also translated his edition as La Psicologia de Averroes. Comentario 
al libra sobre el alma de Arist6teles, trad. Salvador G6MEZ NOGALES, Madrid: Univer-
sidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia, 1987. On the editions and translations of this 
work, see p. 360-361 of Gerhard ENDRESS, Averrois Opera: A Bibliography of Editions 
and Contributions to the Text, in: Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition: Sources, Con-
stitution, and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198), Proceedings of the 
Fourth Symposium Averraicum (Cologne, 1996), ed. G. ENDRESS and J. A. AERTSEN with 
the assist. of K. BRAUN, Leiden - Boston - KOin, 1999, p. 339-381. Regarding the dat-
ing of Averroes' works, I generally follow Jamal ai-DIn AL-'ALAwI, al-Matn al-Rushdl: 
Madkhalli-qira'ajadlda, Casablanca, 1986; and Miguel CRUZ HERNANDEZ, Abu'l-Walld 
MuJ:tammad Ibn Rushd (Averroes): Vida, Obra, Pensamiento, Influencia, Cordoba, 1986 
(19972). 
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intentions (ma'iinin) in the external senses and internal powers and ulti-
mately in the imagination where they come to be by a receptivity differ-
ent from that of physical organs. In contrast to what is the case for sense 
organs, particular apprehended forms as intentions need not replace con-
traries when received into the imagination. Thus, "The imaginative soul 
is distinguished by the fact that it does not need an organic instrument 
for its activity."6 The content of intellectual understanding is found in 
the experience of the individual human knower in such a way that the 
truth of the intelligible is causally grounded in the object in the world 
via the imagined form 7• Yet these intentions and the worldly forms are 
only potentially intelligible until the intentions are acted upon by a sepa-
rate and immaterial power which is per se intellectual. That power is the 
agent intellect which exists separately external to the soul but is required 
for the initial existence of the material intellect and for the actualization 
of the material intellect with intelligibles in human knowing. On this ac-
count, the agent intellect is responsible for the existence of the material 
intellect as "the disposition which is in the forms of the imagination for 
receiving intelligibles" which he names "the first material intellect."8 
In this understanding of the material intellect as a disposition having 
the forms of the imagination as its subject in the Short Commentary 
Averroes follows the lead of Ibn Bajja with confidence enough to char-
acterize that account as true (J:taqq) and demonstrative (burhiinzya) 
(p. 214) in the original version of that work. While close to the view of 
Alexander of Aphrodisias who held that the receptivity he called mate-
rial intellect is a perishable disposition in each human being ceasing at 
the individual's death, Ibn Bajja instead held that this is but a stage on 
the way toward the individual person's higher immortal intellectual 
fulfillment ultimately to be found in conjoining with the separate and 
unique agent intellect. Averroes, however, does not follow Ibn Bajja's 
notion of the soul's assent to the level of a higher unity9. Although in his 
6 Epitome de an., ed. GOMEZ NOGALES (see n. 5), p. 108. 
7 Ibid., p. 116-7. 
8 Ibid., p. 124. 
9 "[T]he philosopher must perform numerous [particular] spiritual acts - but not for 
their own sake - and perform all the intellectual acts for their own sake: the corporeal 
acts enable him to exist as a human, the [particular] spiritual acts render him more noble, 
and the intellectual acts render him divine and virtuous. The man of wisdom is therefore 
necessarily a man who is virtuous and divine. Of every kind of activity, he takes up the 
best only. He shares with every class of men the best states that characterize them. But he 
stands alone as the one who performs the most excellent and noblest of actions. When he 
achieves the final end - that is, when he intellects simple essential intellects, which are 
mentioned in the Metaphysics, On the Soul, and On Sense and the Sensible - he then 
SEPARATE MATERIAL INTELLECT 293 
Long Commentary on the De AnimaiO written ca. 1186 Averroes makes 
a point of stressing - surely with Ibn Bajja in mind - that conjoining 
with the agent intellect is not the end but rather the means to the end of 
intellectual understanding {501}, here in the Short Commentary Aver-
roes refrains from following Ibn Bajja on the issue of personal immortal-
ity and the higher existence of the individual intellectll . Instead Aver-
roes is content to embrace the notion that the material intellect is an 
immaterial disposition, not of the body, but of the imagination. This ap-
proach appears to have the two benefits of keeping the material intel-
lect's immaterial receptivity as a power sufficiently distant from body 
and from the imagination as a bodily power and of meeting the need for 
the material intellect to belong to the individual human knowerl2. Both 
becomes one of those intellects. It would be right to call him simply divine. He will be 
free from the moral sensible qualities, as well as from the high [particular] spiritual quali-
ties: it will be fitting to describe him as a pure divinity." IBN BA.JJA, Tadblr al-Muta-
wal;l;id, in: Rasa'il Ibn Bajja al-ilahfya (Opera Metaphysica), J:iaqqaqaha wa-qaddama 
laha MajId FAKHR1 (al-Dirasat wa-l-nu~ii~ allalsafiyya, I), Bayriit, 1991 2, p. 79-80. Trans-
lated by Lawrence BERMAN, The Governance of the Solitary, in: Ralph LERNER and 
Muhsin MAHDI (eds), Medieval Political Philosophy, Ithaca, N.Y., 19833, p. 131-2. 
10 Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros, rec. 
F. Stuart CRAWFORD (Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem, versionum latina-
rum vo!' 6,1. The Mediaeval Academy of America, pub!. no. 59) Cambridge, MA, 1953. 
Throughout this article citations of the doctrines of this work will be given in {brackets} 
indicating the page numbers of the Latin edition of Crawford. Only fragments of the Ara-
bic are extant. See A. BEN CHEHIDA [IBN SHAHIDA], Iktishiif al-naH al- 'arabI li-ahamm 
ajza' ai-sharI; al-kabir li-Kitab al-Nafs talif Abi l-Walfd ibn Rushd, in: Al-lfayat al-
Thaqafiyya 35 (1985), p. 14-48. 
11 "Averroes may at first have been unsure about the possibility of the human intel-
lect's having the active intellect as an object of thought and conjoining with it. ... [T]he 
body of his Epitome of Aristotle's De anima broaches the subject without committing it-
self to one side or the other." DAVIDSON, Alfarabi (see n. 2), p. 323. 
12 This view is also found in Averroes' Short Commentary on the Parva Naturalia: 
Averrois Cordubensis Compendia librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur, 
textum arabicum rec. et adnotationibus illustravit Henricus BLUMBERG (Corpus Commen-
tarium Averrois in Aristotelem, versionum arabicarum vo!. 7. The Mediaeval Academy of 
America, pub!, no. 80), Cambridge, MA, 1972, p. 79.7-12; AVERROES. Epitome of "Parva 
Naturalia» , translated from the Original Arabic and the Hebrew and Latin Versions [ ... ] 
by Harry BLUMBERG (Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem, versio anglica, vo!' 
7. The Mediaeval Academy of America, pub!, no. 71), Cambridge, MA, 1961, p. 46; 
Averrois Cordubensis Compendia librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur, rec. 
Aemilia L. SHIELDS adiuvante H. BLUMBERG (Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristo-
telem, versionum latinarum vo!. 7. The Mediaeval Academy of America, pub!. no. 54), 
Cambridge, MA, 1949, p. 109-110; his Epistle #2 On Conjunction (ed. M. GEOFFROY et 
C. STEEL [see n. 3]), p. 225-226; his Epistle on the Possibility of Conjunction (ed. K. P. 
BLAND [see n. 3]), p. 28; and De separatione primi principii (ed. C. STEEL and G. GULDEN-
TOPS [see n. 3]), p. 112-120, particularly 118. In a later revised version of the Short Com-
mentary on the De Anima Averroes rejects this account complaining of having been mis-
led by Ibn Bajja and sends his readers to his Long Commentary on the De Anima for a 
proper account. See Epitome de an., ed. GOMEZ NOGALES (see n. 5), p. 128. 
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of those benefits will be eschewed by A verroes in later works, the form-
er in his Middle Commentary and the latter in his Long Commentary. 
In his Middle Commentary, (completed prior to the Long Commen-
tary, perhaps as early as 1181 13), Averroes has come to reconsider the 
reqllisite nature of the material intellect in reflecting on the nature of the 
subject in which this disposition, the material intellect, inheres. As he 
now sees it, the material intellect must be 
completely unmixed with any material form. For, this faculty, which is 
called the material intellect, if it is to think all things - that is, receive the 
forms of all things - cannot be mixed with anyone form; that is, it cannot 
be mixed with the subject in which it is found, as the other material facul-
ties are. 
If the rational faculty were mixed with any form, then one of two things 
would have to occur: either the form of the subject with which it was 
mixed would impede the forms this faculty would receive, or it would 
change them - that is, it would change the form being received. Were this 
so, the forms of things would not exist in the intellect as they really are -
that is, the forms existing in the intellect would be changed into forms dif-
ferent from the actual forms. If, therefore, the nature of the intellect is to 
receive the forms of things which have retained their natures, it is neces-
sary that it be a faculty unmixed with any form whatsoever. 14 
This issue of the unmixed nature of the material intellect together with 
the necessity of it still belonging to the human individual who is said to 
have knowledge led Averroes to stress the immaterial nature of this re-
ceptive power and to associate it more directly with the activity of the 
agent intellect. On this view, the material intellect is essentially founded 
in the agent intellect and its activities upon human souls. He does this by 
holding that material intellect first is given as a remote disposition to 
human individuals at birth 15 by the agent intellect which itself is per se 
immaterial and immortal. Then later in life through the efforts of indi-
viduals at knowing the agent intellect is again present to provide the 
proximate disposition of receptivity and to cause its actualization in the 
reception of intelligibles. In this way Averroes satisfied the need for the 
material intellect to be "unmixed" with the body or a bodily activity and 
yet for it to belong to the individual. 
13 Argument for this view is set forth in the introduction to my forthcoming translation 
of the Long Commentary on the De Anima. 
14 Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's De anima, a critical edition of the 
Arabic text with English translation, notes, and introduction by A. L. IVRY, Provo, UT, 
2002, P 109. Note that I have changed Ivry's rendering of al- 'aql al-hayuliinf from "hylic 
intellect" to "material intellect." 
15 Aristotle's assertion of 'tov voiiv ... SupaSEv, "reason (or intellect) entering from 
outside", at Generation of Animals II 2, 736 b 27, was well known. 
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The philosophical principle at work here is that it is not necessary that 
intellectual dispositions be in or united to their subject after the manner 
of a corporeal accident or substance. Indeed, such a uniting would hinder 
or preclude intellectual understanding. The model for this is the exist-
ence of celestial bodies, souls and intellects16• For Averroes the eternally 
existing and moving celestial bodies are related to their souls in such a 
way that the celestial soul belongs to and is naturally associated with -
or even can be said to be "in" - its corresponding celestial body but 
not in such a way that the body is a subject in which the soul has its ex-
istence. Using this model, Averroes writes that the material intellect is 
nothing other than disposition only - that is, the potential intellect is 
solely disposition, not something in which disposition exists. Although this 
disposition is in a subject, since it is not mixed with the subject, the subject 
does not serve as an intellect in potentiality. This is the opposite of what 
obtains with other material faculties in which the subject is a substance -
either composite (that is, something composed of form and matter) or sim-
ple (the first matter). 17 
A verroes in this way rejected his own earlier account as well as that 
of Ibn Bajja regarding the nature of the material intellect and regarding 
its relationship to human knowers, but not the earlier view that material 
intellect is an individual intellectual power belonging to each particular 
human being. In the Middle Commentary the material intellect is imma-
terial in nature and not related to its subject in such a way as to make a 
composition with the subject in the way substantial or accidental being 
involves composition. And, although the material intellect brought about 
by the agent intellect in both its stages, A verroes went on to explain that 
the material intellect has its own nature distinct from that of the agent 
intellect because the material intellect is able to know privations by be-
ing aware of itself in a disposition of privation. 
Proof that it is not purely a disposition is had in that we find that the mate-
rial intellect apprehends this disposition devoid of the forms and appre-
hends the forms, making it possible thereby to think privations - that is, 
16 See GEOFFROY et STEEL, La beatitude (see n. 3), p. 64-65, 71 ff. On Averroes' cos-
mology see Gerhard ENDRESS, Averroes' De cae1o: Ibn Rushd's cosmology in his com-
mentaries on Aristotle's On the Heaven, in: Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 5 (1995), p. 
9-49, David B. TWEITEN, Averroes on the Prime Mover Proved in the Physics, in: Viator. 
Medieval and Renaissance Studies 26 (1995), p. 107-134, R. C. TAYLOR, Averroes on 
Psychology (see n. 1), and also Averroes' De Substantia Orbis, critical edition of the He-
brew text with English translation and commentary by Arthur HYMAN (Corpus 
Philosophorum Medii Aevi, Opera Averrois. Medieval Academy Books, 96), Cambridge, 
MA - Jerusalem, 1986. 
17 Averroes' Middle Commentary, ed. and trans!' IVRY (see n. 14), p. 110. 
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by virtue of apprehending its essence devoid of forms. This being the case, 
necessarily, that which apprehends this disposition and the forms which 
obtain in it is other than the disposition. 18 
In this way the material intellect is distinguished in substance from 
the one shared agent intellect in having its own nature and in being un-
derstood as a plurality in accord with the number of human beingsl9. 
Such a view of the material intellect might seem naturally to raise the 
question of the possibility of a persisting existence after the perishing of 
the body, but Averroes does not pursue that issue in the Middle Com-
mentary20. However, he does reflect on the alternative of considering the 
material intellect as another separate substance - a view close to his fi-
nal view in the Long Commentary - and rejects it as absurd because it 
would require an entity with incompatible characteristics: on the one 
hand, predisposition and potency for intelligibles, and on the other, the 
actuality of a separate intellectual substance completely actual in its be-
ing. What is more, this would require that humans be rational first 
through separate immaterial intellectual substance and then develop this 
to its full actuality only through temporal activities of a generable and 
corruptible sort21 • Thus, the Middle Commentary rejects the Short Com-
mentary's conception of the material intellect as a receptive disposition 
attached to the forms of the imagination and establishes that each human 
being has an immaterial receptive disposition for intelligibles called the 
material intellect in such a way that it belongs to each human being 
without being in a body or in a bodily power as in a subject. In this fash-
ion Averroes preserves the ability of the material intellect to receive the 
intelligible essences of things in an immaterial way fully free of distor-
tion by being composed with a subject. 
18 Ibid., p. 111. 
19 Ibid., p. 111-112: "It has thus been explained that the material intellect is some-
thing composed of the disposition found in us and of an intellect conjoined to this dispo-
sition. As conjoined to the disposition, it is a disposed intellect, not an intellect in act; 
though, as not conjoined to this disposition, it is an intellect in act; while, in itself, this 
intellect is the Agent Intellect, the existence of which will be shown later. As conjoined to 
this disposition, it is necessarily an intellect in potentiality which cannot think itself but 
which can think other than itself (that is, material things), while, as not conjoined to the 
disposition, it is necessarily an intellect in act which thinks itself and not that which is 
here (that is, it does not think material things)." 
20 See Ivry's remarks on this in the introduction, ibid., p. xxvi-xxxvii. 
21 Ibid., p. 111. "In general, disposition is a distinguishing characteristic of matter, 
and it is impossible for disposition to be found in one genus and its subject in another -
that is, that which is disposed to receive something intelligible must be an intellect." 
Ibid., p. 110. 
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AVERROES' LONG COMMENTARY ON THE DE ANIMA: 
HIS FINAL POSITION ON THE MATERIAL INTELLECT 
In his Long Commentary (ca. 1190) Averroes comes to reject the com-
mon doctrine of the two earlier Commentaries that there is a plurality of 
material intellects in accord with the number of human beings. Instead 
he embraces and expounds at length his 'infamous' final position on the 
material intellect which he had raised as a possibility but without sub-
stantive discussion in a short work called Epistle #1 On Conjunction. 
There he wrote, "it seems, on the issue of this predisposition, that it is a 
substance one in number for all human beings in itself, but many by ac-
cident, which is not the case for material forms. "22 For A verroes this 
conception of the material intellect does not arise merely because there 
should be one material intellect to correspond to one agent intellect nor 
merely because of an adherence to the model of celestial souls and bod-
ies (where each celestial body is itself a species and has a unique mover) 
employed in the Middle Commentary to explain how a mover could be 
associated with its subject without being in composition with it. Rather, 
what drive A verroes to expound his doctrine of a single, shared material 
intellect for all humankind in the Long Commentary are considerations 
both philosophical and thoroughly Aristotelian of the metaphysical and 
epistemological natures of intelligibles themselves and the subject in 
which they come to exist. 
Aside from a few short passages of some relevance in the first two 
Books of the Long Commentary, the chief locus of Averroes' argumen-
tation on the material intellect is to be found in Book 3 which begins 
with what in modern editions is Book 3, chapter 4, of Aristotle's De 
Anima. This is a novel approach compared with his two earlier Commen-
taries and serves to underscore the importance of the doctrine of intel-
lect and its ramifications as the chief focus of Averroes' Book 3. A lit-
eral commentary accompanied by a complete text of Aristotle's De 
Anima, the Long Commentary is substantially controlled by the order of 
Aristotle's presentation, something far from problematic for A verroes 
since he claims to be following and completing Aristotle's philosophical 
psychology. And as he saw it, the part of Aristotle's account which re-
quired completion was that of the material intellect, the power by which 
the understanding of intelligibles, knowledge properly so called, can 
22 GEOFFROYet STEEL, La beatitude (see n. 3), p. 210. 
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take place in human beings existing in bodies23• Nevertheless, Book 3 
contains three sets of comments which are tantamount to extended es-
says on the material intellect and its intelligibles (Comment 5), the agent 
and material intellects as separately existing immaterial substances 
(Comments 18-20), and knowing and conjoining with these separate in-
tellects (Comment 36). The account which follows draws primarily on 
these sets of comments. 
Book 3 of the Long Commentary opens with Aristotle's consideration 
of the part of the soul which thinks and understands and the issue of just 
how the apprehension of intelligibles, conceptualization (ta~awwur bi-/-
'aq/, formare per intellectum), takes place. While conceptualizing is 
similar to sense perception as apprehensive, it differs insofar as concep-
tualizing involves a pure receptivity open to all intelligibles altogether 
unlike sense perception's receptivity which both is delimited by its sub-
ject, the sense organ, and involves change. In the case of the senses, 
change takes place in a particular organ, is apprehended by a particular 
sense power, and yields a particular intention. Intellect, however, has no 
bodily organ, undergoes no change, and has no interfering formal struc-
ture of its own, all of which follow from the nature of the object which 
comes to be realized in it in the intellectual understanding of intelli-
gibles. This is clearly stated at the start of Comment 5: 
[T]hat part of the soul which is called the material intellect has no nature 
and being by which it is constituted inasmuch as it is material except the 
nature of possibility, since it is devoid of all material and intelligible 
forms .... [T]he definition of the material intellect, therefore, is that which 
is in potency all the intentions of universal material forms and is not any of 
the beings in act before it understands any of them. {387} 
The material intellect is also unlike prime matter because of differ-
ences in their potencies, prime matter being a potency for "individual 
and particular forms" resulting in a composite being which is a determi-
nate particular, but material intellect being an apprehensive potency for 
"all the intentions {388} of the universal material forms." 
23 Aristotle writes at De Anima III 7, 431 b 17-19: "In every case the mind which is 
actively thinking is the objects which it thinks. Whether it is possible for it while not ex-
isting separate from spatial conditions to think anything that is separate, or not, we must 
consider later." Averroes, as others in the Arabic and Greek traditions, noted that Aristo-
tle never supplied the promised account and took it upon himself to complete it with his 
own doctrine of the material intellect which he understood to be consequent upon Aristo-
telian principles and so most likely what Aristotle had intended. See the Long Commen-
tary, ed. CRAWFORD (see n. 10), {479) ff. and {399). 
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Averroes' understanding of the nature of a determinate particular en-
tity (al-mushiir ilayhi, aliquid hoc) is central to his consideration of the 
nature of the material intellect and its intelligibles. Corresponding to Ar-
istotle's use of 'tOOE n at De Anima 402 a 24, for Averroes this term 
denotes a determinate particular individual which is a member of a spe-
cies. Given that the role of the material intellect is to understand inten-
tions of universal forms, that is, intelligibles in act which denote species, 
it is evident that the material intellect cannot be properly said to under-
stand determinate particular individuals - members of species - which 
are intelligibles only in potency. That is, the material intellect "must re-
ceive forms by a mode of reception other than that by which those'mat-
ters receive the forms whose contraction by matter is the determination 
of prime matter in them." {388} There is no way for the material intel-
lect to receive determinate particulars - that is, to know with the mean-
ing of intellectual apprehension and conceptualization - and at the 
same time be the very entity it is posited to be in the process of intellec-
tual understanding. 
This understanding of what it is to be a determinate particular entity 
(al-mushiir ilayhi, aliquid hoc) when joined with the intrinsic nature of 
the material intellect as described above results in the exclusion of direct 
knowledge of particulars as such on the part of the material intellect. But 
this notion of the determinate particular entity is also applicable to the 
consideration of the nature of the material intellect. It must itself not be a 
determinate particular entity simply because if it were so, then whatever 
were received into it would be contracted to the determinate particularity 
of its subject. That is, any received intelligible in act would be particular-
ized by the subject into which it is received - the material intellect -
and thereby become an intelligible in potency only. The result is that the 
material intellect cannot be a determinate particular entity and thereby 
cannot be possessed individually by any particular human being. Yet 
given that the receptive power called the material intellect must exist for 
human intellectual understanding to take place, the only alternative is 
that the material intellect is itself a unique species, a single entity fully 
identical with its species and not a plurality in its own nature. Conse-
quently, for A verroes the metaphysics of intelligibles dictates that there 
be one material intellect shared by all human beings, precisely as Epistle 
#1 On Conjunction had suggested as possible. Just how this is possible 
while at the same time different individual human beings realize differing 
levels of intellectual understanding must also be explained by A verroes. 
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A verroes is himself well aware that human intellectual experience 
does not entail that when one person understands something, every other 
person understands it, although it perhaps appears that such a thing must 
result if the material intellect is in itself one, as just argued, and shared 
by all human beings. He is equally aware that it cannot be the case that 
one and the same intelligible in act exists in Zayd as such and also in 
'Amr as such. Not only would this be precluded by the problem of the 
contraction of the intelligible in act into particularity taking place as a 
result of the particularity of its subject, it would also entail the existence 
of multiple intelligibles in act (essences) of the very same intelligible in 
act (essence). That would then generate an infinite regress in accord with 
the Third Man Argument with the positing of another intelligible in act 
over those and so forth to infinity. {411} On this argument it is clear that 
the metaphysical natures of the intelligible in act and the subject or sub-
jects into which it can be received and retain its nature, require a theory 
by which the intelligibles are in a single, shared material intellect and 
yet somehow generated by and functionally present in particular deter-
minate human individuals. The theory which A verroes sets forth to meet 
this challenge is that of the two subjects. 
Averroes' understanding of Aristotle's account of sense perception 
provides him with a model for understanding how apprehension can in-
volve two distinct subjects. 
Conceptualizing, as Aristotle says, is just as apprehending by sense. But 
apprehending by sense is something which is actualized through two sub-
jects, one the subject in virtue of which the sense is true (this is the thing 
sensed outside the soul) and the other the subject in virtue of which the 
sense is an existing form (this is the first actuality of the sense organ). 
Hence, the intelligibles in act must also have two subjects, one the subject 
in virtue of which they are true, namely, the forms which are true images, 
and the other that in virtue of which the intelligibles are among the beings 
in the world, and this latter is the material intellect. {400} 
The subject in virtue of which intelligibles are true is the image pro-
vided by a human individual subsequent to sense perception. The needed 
procuring of an intention suitable for presentation to the separate intel-
lects for abstraction takes place when the particular image or intention 
formed in the internal sense powers is denuded of non-essential charac-
teristics through the activity of the cogitative power and deposited in 
memory.24 This intention, still the intentional form of a particular exist-
24 "That individual intention is what the cogitative power discerns from the imagined 
form and refines from the things which were conjoined with it from those common and 
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ing in the human brain, is the presented before the separate intellects for 
abstraction. In this way, the subject by which the intelligible in act is 
true consists of the image in the internal sense powers of the individual 
human knower who has derived the content of the intelligible from sen-
sory experience of the world. And since the metaphysics of intelligibles 
in act does not permit the reception of the intelligible in act into a deter-
minate particular human being as explained above, that intelligible in act 
comes into existence, that is, is "among the beings in the world," in the 
material intellect as its subject of existence. 
A verroes follows Aristotle in using the metaphor of light to explain 
this abstraction and the roles of the two intellects when he likens the 
material intellect to the transparent medium and the agent intellect to the 
light which in Aristotelian physics moves the medium from being trans-
parent in potency to being transparent in act. 
[T]he relation of the material forms {411} to [the material intellect] is [the 
same as] the relation of color to the transparent [medium]. For just as light 
is the actuality of the transparent [medium], so the agent intellect is the ac-
tuality of the material [intellect]. Just as the transparent [medium] is not 
moved by color and does not receive it except when there is light, so too 
that intellect does not receive the intelligibles which are here except insofar 
as it is actualized through that [agent] intellect and illuminated by it. Just as 
light makes color in potency to be in act in such a way that it can move the 
transparent [medium], so the agent intellect makes the intentions in po-
tency to be intelligible in act in such a way that the material intellect re-
ceives them. This, then, is how the material intellect and the agent [intel-
lect] should be understood. {41O-11} 
Abstraction or conceptualization, then, is genuinely based on human 
perceptual experience for its content and does not rely on illumination or 
emanation of intelligible content from a transcendent entity. The role of 
the agent intellect in this account is solely to explain the way that inten-
tions which are intelligible in potency by its intellectual 'light' come to 
be intelligibles in act. With its light it makes actual what was presented 
to it as potential, namely the intentions, and then it impresses these on 
the material intellect in the same act since these intentions now intelligi-
ble in act require a subject for their existence. 
proper sensibles, {226) and it deposits it in the memory. This same [individual intention) 
is what the imaginative [power) apprehends, but the imaginative [power) apprehends it as 
conjoined to those sensibles, although its apprehension is more spiritual." 
"For, just as the subject of vision moving [vision), which is color, moves it only when 
color is made to be in act through the presence of light after it was in potency, so too the 
imagined intentions move the material intellect only when the intelligibles are made to be 
in act after they were in potency." {40 1 }. 
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The metaphysical consideration of the very natures of intelligibles as 
such, the nature of the material intellect as subject into which they are 
received, and the nature of the agent intellect require that there be three 
distinct substances involved: the human subject, the material intellect, 
andthe agent intellect. Nevertheless, Averroes holds that these activities 
must be understood as taking place in us . 
. 
For just as sight is not moved by colors except when they are in act, which 
is not realized unless light is present since it is what draws them from po-
tency into act, so too the imagined intentions do not move the material in-
tellect except when the intelligibles are in act, because it is not actualized 
by these unless something else is present, namely, the intellect in act. It 
was necessary to ascribe these two activities to the soul in us, namely, to 
receive the intelligible and to make it, although the agent and the recipient 
are eternal substances, on accqunt of the 'fact that these two activities are 
reduced to our will, namely, to abstract intelligibles and to understand 
them. For to abstract is nothing other than to make imagined intentions in-
telligible in act after they were [intelligible] in potency. But to understand 
is nothing other than to receive these intentions. For when we found the 
same thing, namely, the imagined intentions, is transferred in its being 
from one order into another, we said that this must be from an agent cause 
and a recipient cause. The recipient, however, is the material [intellect] and 
the agent is [the intellect] which brings [this] about. {439} 
The human experience of the attainment of knowledge through per-
sonal effort at study and refiectiolJ reveals the existence of the powers of 
these separately existing intellects present in the s()ul, for use by indi-
vidual knowers. And while they may appear to be one intellect when 
they are acting in concert in the formation of intelligibles in act insofar 
as there is one actuality of the recipient material intellect from the agent 
intellect {450-1 }, still they are two distinct substances. Tht; nature of the 
agent intellect is such that it is actuality of activity in its substance and 
that it "understands nothing of the things which are here" {444}. The 
nature of the material intellect, in contrast, is such as to receive the 
forms of things here in the world as intentions intelligible in act when 
they have been "transferred" in "being from one .order into anotlter." 
A verroes also describes the implementation of these intellectual pow-
ers of the soul as a conjoining (itti~iil) with separate intellect and as the 
attainment of our "final form." As already indicated, knowing or con-
joining is an activity which is initiated by human individuals in the em-
ployment of the cogitative power which organizes intentions and distills 
from them a particular intention denuded of extraneous characteristics25 • 
2S "[W]ithout the imaginative power and the cogitative [power] the intellect which is 
called material understands nothing." {450}. 
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Deposited into memory, this is what the individual presents before the 
powers of material intellect and agent intellect for abstraction. That ab-
straction is a conjoining with the intellects for the sake of generating 
knowledge and is called "acquired intellect" (al- 'aql al-mustafiid, intel-
lectus adeptus). Subsequent to that, what is left in the individual human 
being is a facility for recalling knowledge once attained called "theoreti-
cal intellect" (al- 'aql al-na~arl, intellectus speculativus), that is, a facil-
ity in the individual to conjoin again with the separate material intellect 
where the intelligibles in act exist in a subject. This may be described as 
the locus of theoretical intelligibles in us, but should not be taken in the 
sense that the intelligibles in act are literally present in individual human 
beings since that is metaphysically impossible on the account given 
above. Note that this facility for conjoining or recollecting previously 
attained knowledge is something real in the human individual thanks 
only to its previous conjoining with the material intellect and agent intel-
lect. This explains how it that when one person knows something, an-
other does'not, even though there is but one shared material intellect for 
all humankind26. By the use of imagination, cogitation and memory in 
abstractive conjoining with the separate intellects, there results an abid-
ing link called "intellect in a positive disposition" (al- 'aql bi-l-malaka, 
intellectus In habitu) had only by those who have provided the content 
of abstraction and who have thereby been conjoined with the separate 
intellects in the process of the generation of intelligibles27• 
The conjoining which takes place is no mystical moment but merely 
the explanation of the epistemological process of forming and grasping 
intelligibles in knowledge. 
[W]hen the theoretical intelligibles are conjoined with us through forms of 
the imagination and the agent intellect is conjoined with the theoretical 
intelligibles (for that which apprehends [theoretical intelligibles] is the 
26 Regarding the cogitative power and the new, central role it plays in the Long Com-
mentary, Richard C. TAYLOR, Remarks on Cogitatio in Averroes' Commentarium Mag-
num in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, in: Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition (see n. 
5), p. 217-255; ID., Averroes' Epistemology and Its Critique by Aquinas, in: Thomistic 
Papers VII. Medit!val Masters: Essays in memory of Msgr. E. A. Synan, ed. by R. E. 
HOUSER, Houston, TX, 1999, p. 147-177; and ID., Cogitatio, Cogitativus and Cogitare: 
Remarks on the Cogitative Power in Averroes, in: Jacqueline HAMESSE, Carlos STEEL 
(eds), L'elaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Age. Actes du colloque in-
ternational de Louvain-Ia-Neuve et Leuven, 12-14 sept. 1998 [ ... ], Louvain-Ia-Neuve-
Leuven, 2000, p. 111-146. 
27 Averroes' Commentary on the De Intellectu of Alexander also asserts that "the ma-
terial intellect is one power shared by individual souls" and that the theoretical 
intelligibles are "in its essence ungenerable and incorruptible." M. ZONTA, La tradizione 
(see n. 3), p. 29. 
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same, namely, the material intellect), it is necessary that the agent intellect 
be coupled with us through the conjoining of the theoretical intelligibles. 
{500} 
As indicated earlier, however, this conjoining with separate intellect is 
not the end or final cause of human existence. That end is rather the 
same as found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics X 7 and its account of 
ultimate human happiness, intellectual fulfillment to the extent possible 
for humans within the limits bf their nature and species. Conjoining is 
the means to the end of human intellectual perfection. {SOl} That end is 
achieved when separate intellect comes to be "form for us" and "our fi-
nal form." {444-S, 485-6, 490} This conjoining is not properly the gen-
eration of intelligibles by the agent intellect in individual human beings 
as subjects for the metaphysical reasons cited earlier nor is it merely the 
generation of intelligibles in the material intellect. The principle which 
must be observed here is this: "because that in virtue of which some-
thing carries out its proper activity is the form, while we carry out {SOO} 
our proper activity in virtue of the agent intellect, it is necessary that the 
agent intellect be form in us." This is simply for the reason already 
given above: we are "able to generate intelligibles when we wish" {SOO} 
since "these two activities are reduced to our will. " {439} 
THE IMPORTANCE OF AVERROES' FINAL POSITION ON THE 
MATERIAL INTELLECT FOR METAPHYSICS AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY, RELIGION AND POLITICS 
That his mature teachings on the material intellect play an essential role 
in his metaphysical thought is stressed by A verroes in both his Long 
Commentary on the De Anima and in his Long Commentary on the 
Metaphysics (ca. 1190). In the former he writes, 
The metaphysician gets from it the substance of his subject. For here [in 
the science of the soul] it will be explained that the separate forms are in-
telligences and also many other things concerning the knowledge of states 
consequent upon intelligence considered as intelligence and intellect. {5} 
This is so for Averroes because the detailed investigation into the na-
ture of human knowing yields the doctrine of the material intellect as an 
entity which has the nature of receptive potency for intelligibles and at 
the same time must be an intellect which is a unique species of entity 
since it is the subject for intelligibles in act. At Metaphysics VII, 1026 a 
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27-32, Aristotle argued that First Philosophy would have to be physics 
unless there could be shown some existent which is not body or conse-
quent upon body. For Averroes, this is shown in physics with its account 
of celestial motion, as he explains in his Long Commentary on the Meta-
physics: 
[I]t is fully clear that these celestial bodies are alive and that among the 
powers of soul they have only intellect and the power of desire, i.e. [intel-
lect] which causes motion in place. This is perhaps evident from what I 
say, for it has been explained in the eighth book of the Physics that what 
causes motion belonging to the celestial bodies is not in matter and is a 
separate form. And It was explained in the De Anima that the separate 
forms are intellect. So, consequently, this mover is an intellect ana is a 
mover insofar as it is an agent of motion and insofar as it is the end of 
motion.28 
Physics, with its demonstration of the existence of an unmoved mover 
as form separate from matter, provided the account sufficient to show 
that there is a First Philosophy beyond physics, namely metaphysics. But 
physics as natural science is limited to consideration of bodies and their 
attributes. It remains, then, for another science to explain the natures of 
immaterial entities. And it is philosophical psychology which provides 
the needed insight by its arguments about the nature of intelligibles, the 
separate intellects and human knowing. This doctrine shows that sepa-
rate intellect in the cases of the agent intellect and the material intellect 
must be separate form free of the determinate particularity of body. This 
A verroes takes as evidence that the separate form shown to exist in 
physics must be intellect. 
There is still more for metaphysics to be had from the doctrine of the 
material intellect for the establishment of the natures of God and the 
higher intellects moving the heavens. In view of the movements of the 
heavens, physics and cosmology are able to posit these unmoved movers 
in a hierarchy, but that hierarchy is not per se but per accidens. The hier-
archy is based on the movement these cause and is not explained on the 
28 Averroes: TaJsfr Mii baod af-Tabtat (<<Grand Commentaire» de la Mhaphysique), 
texte arabe inedit, etabli par Maurice BOUYGEs, 3 vols (Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasti-
corum, serie arabe, 5-7), [vol. 4:] Notice, Beirut, 1938-1952, Book Lam c. 36, p. 1593-4. 
My translation. Cf. Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Libri XlIII cum Averrois Cordubensis in 
eosdem commentariis et epitome in: Aristotelis Opera Cum Averrois Commentariis, Vene-
tiis Apud Iunctas, 1574, vol. VIII, Liber XII c. 36: fol. 318rv F-G. These Latin texts are 
cited here according to the 1962 Minerva (Frankfurt am Main) reprint. See also: Ibn 
Rushd's Metaphysics, a translation with introduction ofIbn Rushd's commentary on Aris-
totle's Metaphysics, Book Liim by Charles GENEQUAND (Islamic Philosophy and Theol-
ogy. Texts and studies, 1), Leiden, 1984, p. 149. 
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basis of the very natures of these immaterial intellects29. Here again 
A verroes finds a central role for his doctrine of the material intellect 
which established that apparently incompatible characteristics, potency 
and immaterial intellectual nature, can exist in a single entity3o. This po-
tency thereby allows for an understanding of the per se nature of sepa-
rate intellects sufficient to explain their plurality and hierarchy. In the 
Long Commentary on the De ~nima he explicitly notes this: 
One should hold that it [scil. the material intellect] is a fourth kind of be-
ing. For just as sensible being is divided into form and matter, so too intel-
ligible being must be divided into things similar to these two, namely, into 
something similar to form and into something similar to matter. This is 
[something] necessarily present in every separate intelligence which under-
stands something else. And if not, then there would be no multiplicity 
{41O} in separate forms. It was already explained iIJ First Philosophy that 
there is no form free of potency without qualification except the First Form 
which understands nothing outside itself. Its being is its quiddity. Other 
forms, however, are in some way different in quiddity and being. {409-1O} 
Well aware of the extreme to which Aristotelian epistemological and 
metaphysical issues have compelled him, A verroes in this way finds in 
his new doctrine of the material intellect not only the needed account for 
philosophical psychology but also the grounds for the metaphysics ex-
plaining the hierarchy of intellects31 . 
The doctrine of the material intellect as well has important ramifica-
tions for religion and politics in the thought of A verroes. Assuming 
sound his famous remarks in the Incoherence of the Incoherence that his 
"books of demonstration"32 contain accounts which are not merely per-
29 Cf. Harry A. WOLFSON, The Plurality of Immovable Movers in Aristotle and Awr-
roes, in: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958), p. 233-253. 
30 "If it were not for this genus of beings [scil. separate intellects] which we have 
come to know in the science of the soul, we could not understand multiplicity in separate 
things, to the extent that, unless we know here the nature of the intellect, we cannot know 
that the separate moving powers ought to be intellects." {41O} Cf. R. C. TAYLOR, Aver-
roes on Psychology (see n. 1). 
31 The potency found in separate intellects below the First Cause is that of a reference 
in their being to the First Cause as their ultimate final cause. This issue is taken up at 
greater length in my 1998 presentation at the Cordoba Conference in honor of the anni-
versary of the death of Averroes. It is forthcoming as Averroes' Philosophical Conception 
of Separate Intellect and God in a collection of papers from the conference to be pub-
lished in Paris in 2004. 
32 AVERROES, Tahafot at-tahafot. L'incoherence de l'incoherence, ed. Maurice Bouy-
GES (Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, serie arabe, 3), Beirut, 1930, p. 427-428; trans!. 
Simon VAN DEN BERGH, Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tahafut. (The Incoherence of the Incoher-
ence), 2 vols (E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, N. S., 19), London, 1954, repr. 1969, vo!' II, 
p. 257-8. 
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suasive in nature but demonstrative and necessary, it is evident that he in 
fact holds that there is no immortality for individual human beings. 
What belongs per se to each human being as particular determinate en-
tity consists in the body, its accidents and the internal powers of the 
soul. The intellects by which individuals can be called knowers are in-
cluded in the definition of a human being insofar as there is a natural 
relationship of affinity and cooperation but this relationship is a func-
tional one, not one whereby intellect is per se present in the individual 
human being. Rather, the immortality promised in the Law must in fact 
be understood to refer to the eternally persisting existence of the sepa-
rate material intellect in which all human beings may have the op{1ortu-
nity to share. That sharing depends on proper moral conduct since theo-
retical excellence requires virtue and excellence of character. As he says 
in his Commentary on the Republic (ca. 1195), 
[T]his kind of perfection-i.e. the moral, is laid down [in relation to] theo-
retical perfection as a preparatory rank, without which the attainment of the 
end is impossible. Hence, this perfection is thought to be the ultimate end 
because of its proximity to the ultimate end. It appears from this, then, that 
the human perfections are ... all for the sake of theoretical perfection.33 
Religious doctrines promising individuals post mortem rewards or 
punishments cannot be taken at face value by the demonstrative philoso-
pher in search of truth34• The ultimate end of human beings as rational 
and mortal entities spelled out in the Long Commentary on the De 
Anima yields the understanding that the value of religious doctrines is to 
be determined by their efficacy in "the instruction of the masses gener-
ally"35 in the sound moral life which the end of theoretical perfection re-
quires. The end of religion on this account is political, namely to work to 
provide the moral society in which theoretical perfection of human intel-
33 Ralph LERNER (trans!.), Averroes on Plato's "Republic", trans!. with introd. and 
notes by R. L., Ithaca - London, 1974, p. 92 (p. 72.29-34 of the Hebrew edition by E. I. 
J. Rosenthal). 
34 There is no doctrine of 'Double Truth' here or anywhere in the thought of Averroes. 
See my 'Truth does not contradict truth': Averroes and the Unity of Truth, in: Topoi 19 
(2000), p. 3-16. On the issue of personal immortality, see Richard C. TAYLOR, Personal 
Immortality in Averroes' Mature Philosophical Psychology, in: Documenti e studi sulla 
traduzione filosofica medievale 9 (1998), p. 87-110. Regarding Averroes' treatment of 
religious propositions, see ID., Averroes' Philosophical Analysis of Religious Proposi-
tions, in: Jan A. AERTSEN and Andreas SPEER (eds), What is Philosophy in the Middle 
Ages? [ ... J Proceedings of the 10th International Congress of Medieval Philosophy of the 
S.l.E.P.M., 25-30 August 1997 in Erfurt, 2 vols (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 26), Berlin-
New York, 1998, p. 888-894. 
35 AVERROES, Tahafot at-tahafot (see n. 32), p. 582; VAN DEN BERGH, Averroes' 
Tahafut (see n. 32), vo!. II, p. 360. 
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lect may be pursued. As such, it is not for the philosopher to undermine 
that means to the end. As Averroes says in his Incoherence of the Inco-
herence, 
[I]t belongs to the necessary excellence of a man of learning that he should 
not despise the doctrines in which he has been brought up, and that he 
, should explain them in the fairest way, and that he should understand that 
the aim of these doctrines lies in their universal character, not in their par-
ticularity, and that, if he expresses a doubt concerning the religious princi-
ples in which he has been brought up, or explains them in a way contradic-
tory to the prophets and turns away from their path, he merits more than 
anyone else that the term unbeliever should be applied to him, and he is 
liable to the penalty for unbelief in the religion in which he has been 
brought Up.36 
The thought of Averroes played no major role in the development of 
Arabic philosophy in the Islamic world in the Middle Ages. However, it 
was important for the development of Jewish and Christian philosophi-
cal and theological thought3? In the Arab world interest in his thought 
was stirred by works of European thinkers such as Renan38 in the Nine-
teenth Century and A verroes soon became the object of study in Arabic 
even though many of his most important philosophical works such as his 
Long Commentary on the Physics and Long Commentary on the De 
Anima as well as other writings were available only in Latin or Hebrew. 
This led to a distorted and partial view of this philosopher, just as the 
Medieval Latin West's partial view of him was distorted by the unavail-
ability of important dialectical works such as his Incoherence of the In-
coherence, his Decisive Treatise, and others39. In recent years thanks to 
new editions, translations and studies, it has become possible to gain a 
more comprehensive, coherent and accurate picture of A verroes and his 
philosophy. In that vein the present article has shown that Averroes' 
doctrine of the material intellect is by no means a "fantastic conception, 
intelligible neither to himself nor to others" but rather a carefully and 
36 AVERROES, Tahiifot at-tahiifot (see n. 32), p. 583; VAN DEN BERGH, Averroes' Taha· 
fut (see n. 32), vol. II, p. 360. Averroes' philosophical conception of God and of religion 
is discussed in my article Averroes: God and the Nobel Lie, forthcoming in Laudemus 
Viros Gloriosos: Essays in Medieval Philosophy in Honor of Armand Augustine Maurer, 
c.s.b., ed. R. E. HOUSER (Notre Dame, in: University of Notre Dame Press). 
37 For a brief account of this, see DAVIDSON, Alfarabi (see n. 2), p. 298-314. 
38 Ernest RENAN, Averroes et l'averroi'sme, in: (Euvres completes de Ernest Renan, 
edition definitive etablie par Henriette PSICHARI, 10 vols, Paris, 1845-1892, vol. III (Paris: 
Calmann-Levy, Editeurs, 1852). 
39 Anke VON KUGELGEN, Averroes und die arabische Moderne. Ansatze zu einer 
Neubegriindung des Rationalismus im Islam (Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science, 
19), Leiden - New York - K51n, 1994. 
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thoughtfully argued doctrine. And, while it has to be acknowledged that 
his teaching on the material intellect is not found as such in Aristotle, it 
is also true that it is set forth and developed from principles not "wholly 
un-Aristotelian" but thoroughly Aristotelian in character. What is more, 
his metaphysical and epistemological principles can be seen to ground 
the coherence of his ethical, political and religious thought. 
